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LEvY

AND ATTACHMENT UPON STOCK CERTIFICATES.-COrpO-

rate stock is regarded by the law as personal property of the stockholder, in the nature of a chose in action. At common law, it, like
other choses in action, could not be reached by process of levy or
attachment.' Now, however, almost2 everywhere, statutes authorize
levy upon and attachment of stock. Consequently there is at the
present time practically no question that stock may be attached or
levied upon as property of the stockholder, under proper statutory.
procedure and in the proper place. . But the question of what is a
proper place-what stock may be attached or levied upon in a particular jurisdiction, or what jurisdiction can levy upon or attach certain stock-has not been satisfactorily answered in all of its aspects.
The cases in which this problem is involved are most frequently cases
construing federal or state statutes governing execution, garnishment, or foreign attachment. Although these cases are necessarily
affected by the wording of the particular statute in question, they
are decided largely on general principles as to the nature and situs of
corporate stock,3 and therefore may properly be considered in this
discussion.

It was settled without any great difficulty that under these statutes, stock could be attached or levied upon by process served on the
corporation at its domicile, regardless of the location of the stock certificates or of the residence of the owner.4 Thus, under foreign attachment statutes, attachment of the stock at the domicile of the corporation is effectual to give the court jurisdiction of the non-resident
owner upon whom personal service cannot be obtained." The stock
is regarded as property having a siti's at the domicile of the corporation, and, therefore, subject to process there. Most cases apply this
principle exclusively to corporations incorporated within the jurisdiction, but a few have extended it to permit process against stock
of foreign corporations which, however, have their main office or do
their main business within the jurisdiction." But the courts which
'Denton v. Lvingston. o Johns. 96 (N. Y., IS12); Fowler v. Dickson,
I Boyce n13, 74 Atl. 6oi (Del., 19o9).
'See

Cook, Corporations, (8th ed.) sec. 482; Fletcher, Corporations, see.

3140.

E.-g., Statutes authorizing attachment of corporate stock are, because
of the courts' view as to the nature and situs of stock in general, construed as
applicable to stock of domestic corporations only.
'Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. I (i8w9); Barber v.
Morgan, 84 Conn. 6i8, 8o At. 791 (igi I); Hook v. Hoffman, i6 Ariz. 54.o,
147 Pac. 722 (1915).

'Cases cited in note 4, supra.
"Bowman v. Breyfogle, 145 Ky. 443, 140 S. W. 694 (igr); Dean Tel.
Co. v. Howell. 162 Mo. App. 700, 144 S. W. 135 (911). Contra: Ashley v.
Quintard, go Fed. 84 (C. C., x898).
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permit this do so on the ground that the corporation is in reality
domiciled in the jurisdiction; 7 thus they extend the doctrine, but
do not really break in upon it.
When, however, efforts were made to obtain a levy or an attachment, not by process on the corporation at its domicile, but by
seizure of the certificates of stock present in a state 8 other than the
domicile of the corporation, serious difficulty arose. The courts that
have considered the validity of such a levy or attachment have
reached results that have differed with the differing views of the
various courts in regard to the real nature of a stock certificate.
The older and classic conception of a stock certificate, as was
once the case in regard to negotiable instruments in the eyes of the
common law, is that it is but a muniment of title, having no value in
itself except as evidence of the ownership of a right." Under this
view it could not be deemed to be property, and consequently it could
have no situs as property. Entirely consistent with this view then,
are the cases which hold that the state in which certificates of stock
of a foreign corporation are located has not, by reason of the presence
of the certificates, any property within its borders upon which levy or
attachment can operate, and that in the very nature of things, the
statutes cannot change this situation. In-one of the cases it is said
that there could be no more basis for. a levy or attachment of the
stock by seizure of the certificates, than there could be for a levy on
real estate in another state by seizure of the title deeds. 0 This has
been the attitude of the great majority of courts.'1 Mr. Cook states
the doctrine of the cases to be that the situs of stock for purposes of
attachment, garnishment, and
execution is at the domicile of the cor2
poration and nowhere. else.'
* But is all this consistent with the practical status of stock certificates in modem life? It is certainly not the popular or business
concept. Stock certificates are owned and handled by thousands of
persons every day, but very few of these persons think of their certificates as mere evidence; they consider them as property and deal
with them as such. True, the certificates are not the shares; the
'Wait v. Kern River Mining Co., 157 Cal. 16, io6 Pac. 98 (i9o9).
"Since most of the cases are ones arising in the United States, the term
"state" will be here used as synonymous with "jurisdiction," thus including
within its meaning any- foreigh jurisdiction.
' Christmas v. Biddle, 13 Pa. 223 0 85o); ,V'mslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn.
390, 4 Atl. 250 (88s); 0. L. Packard Co. v. Laev, ioo Wis. 644, 76 N. W.
576 (i898).

"Christmas v. Biddle, supra, note 9.

' 1Christmas v; Biddle, supra, note 9.;Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. $92
(1883); Winslow v. Fletcher, supra, note 9; Smith v. Downey, 8 Ind. App.
179, 35 N. E. 568 (893) ; Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., ig R. I. 8o, 32 Ati.
921 (1895).
'Cook, Corporations, (8th ed.) sec. 48_t
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shares would exist though the certificate were destroyed. But in
ninety-nine situations out of a hundred, he who owns the certificate
owns the shares; he who controls the certificate controls the shares.
There is fully as close a relation between the certificate and the
shares as there is between a negotiable bill of lading and the goods
shipped under it. And the law distinctly treats the bill of lading as
representing the goods, as controlling the title.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act"4 emphasizes this practical
situation in its provision that a bona Jlde holder for value of the
stock certificate is entitled to the stock, even if a prior transfer of
the shares has been rescinded or set aside; 15 and also in its provision
that no levy or attachment of stock for which a certificate is outstanding shall be valid until such certificate be actually seized or
surrendered,
or until its transfer has been enjoined.'
. Judge Thayer,
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
of the Eighth Circuit, has summed up the situation as follows-:.
"Speaking technically, it is true that a stock certificate is written
evidence of a certain interest in corporate property. The same may
be- said of notes and bills. They are simply evidence of indebiedness
on the part of the individuals or corporations who issue them. But
in the business world such obligations or securitieg are treated as
something more than' mere muniments of' title. They are daily
bought and sold like ordinary chattels, they may be hypothecated or
pledged, they have an inherent market value, and while differing in
some respects from chattels, they are generally classified as personal
property."' 4
If this is the true status of stock certificates today, one might
well expect to find a changing attitude among the courts, moving
toward a view which would more nearly coincide with the practical
situation. If the certificates 'are property, they should be subject to
the same burdens as other property, in the way of levy and attachment, provided, of course, there is a statute of 'the jurisdiction making corporate stock subject to such process. And furthermore, such i
levy should be recognized as a levy on the stock itself, and a sale
under the levy should pass title to the stock.
This view is taken by a few courts. One of the earliest cases
.inwhich it is applied is a Minnesota decision, in which the court
said,-.-"We ought not . . . to announce any doctrine which will

permit a person to bring within our borders certificates of stock in

"See, 39 U. S. STAT. AT L. 542; Uniform Bills of Lading-Act, see. 24 (enacted in :4 states) ; Brimberg v. Hartenfeld Bag Co., 89 N.J. Eq. 425, 429,
10S At. 68, 69 (i918).
" Enacted in 17 states. See, Tyler. v. Dane County, 289 Fed. 843, 851
(D. C., 1923).
'Sec. &
"Sec. 13.
= Merritt v. American Steel Barge Co., 7"9Fed. 28 (C. C. A., x897).

406

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

a foreign corporation, sell or hypothecate them, to treat them as
personal property when seeking redress in our courts for an unlawful interference with oir appropriation of the same, and then to insist
that they are not within our statute which provides.that 'property'
shall be subject to garnishment, or within our statutes relating to the
seizure of property by virtue of writs of attachment or execution." *8
The New York courts have been particularly outspoken in supporting this view, and Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co. 1. is
cited as the leading case on the subject. A number of decisions in
the lower federal courts 2 0 take the same position, and the United

States Supreme Court several years ago, expressly sustained a levy

on stock effected by mere seizure of the certificates,21 although in
that case the stock was that of a domestic corporation.
It is to be noted that all of these cases have arisen simply on
the question of the validity of the levy or attachment under the law
of the jurisdiction in which such action was attempted. The courts
which adhered to the older attitude construed their statutes which
authorized levy, attachment, or garnishment of "property" within
the state, or of corporate stock, as being applicable to stock of domestic corporations only. Those that have taken the newer view
simply construe their statutes to include the stock of foreign corporations as property within the state, if the certificates are there.
But they decide nothing in regard to the efficacy of such a levy or
attachment to affect-the stock at the domicile of the corporation, and
it is not for a moment suggested that the new view establishes an
exclusive situs for levy and httachment at the place where the certificates are. -There is no attempt to displace the well-settled theory of
the situs of stock at the domicile of the co.rporation. The new view
is merely to recognize, for certain purposes, an additional situs.
To the situation of a double situs thus created, and to the cases
crcating it, the objection is made that there is created but an empty
right in a person who purchases stock certificates at a sale under
such a levy or attachment, or who otherwise lawfully acquires them
thereunder. 2 It is argued that even if the courts of a state do de" Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. Mather, 6o MiLn. 362, 62 N. W. 396 (1895).
"6 N. Y. 193, s8 N. E. F6 (xgoo). Also, Wynn v. Grifenhagen, 167
App. Div. 572 (N. Y., 9zS); Gen. Motors Corp'n v. Ver Linden, 199 App.

Div. 375, 192 N. Y Supp. 28 (1922).
"Merritt v. American Steel Barge Co., .-upra, note 17; Blake v. Foreman
Bros.' Co., 218 Fed. 264 (D. C., 1914); Beal. v. Carpenter, 235 Fed.*273 (C.
C. A., 1916); Mitchell v. Leland Co., 246 Fed. 103 (C. C. A., 1917). See,
S. 376 (igig). (a tax case).
De. Ganay
There *.
areLederer.
dicta to25o-U.
the contrary, however, in a number of federal cases,
e. g., Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., supra, note 4; Miller v. Kaliwerke,
etc., Gesellschaft, -83 Fed. 746 (C. C. A., 1g2).
I Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U. S. zo (,g92).
'See Winslow v. Fletcher, supra, note i.
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clare that the levy or attachment was valid and that title passed to
the purchaser thereunder, the corporation, domiciled in another state,
would not be bound to transfer the shares to him on its books, or to
allow him to participate as a stockholder in its affairs, or to pay him
dividends,-all rights which must be enforced in the state of the
corporation's domicile.2 3 And it has been said that the courts of tle
state where the corporation is domiciled would be doing all they
would be bound to do under the full faith and credit clause of the
federal Constitution if they recognized that title to certain pieces of
paper,-4. e., the certificates,--had passed to the purchaser.
The case of Bank fir Handel und Industrie v. United States
Steel Corporation,et al.,24 recently decided in the United States Supreme Court, provides a partial, if not a complete answer to this
objection. The case involved the title to certain stock of the U. S.
Steel Corporation (a New Jersey corporation) which was owned
by German banks at the outbreak of the World War. The certifi-"
cates, indorsed in blank, were at that time in England, some pledged
as collateral, and some in possession of London branches of the German banks. The British Public Trustee seized these certificates as
alien property,; and by virtue of English law they became vested in
him. The German banks had never been registered as owners of the
stock on the books of the corporation, they having received the certificates indorsed in blank. In the present case, therefore, the :banks
sought a decree that they be registered as owners and that the outstanding certificates be cancelled by the corporation. It was their
contention that the seizure and vesting of the certificates in England
could not affect the title to the shares in America, and that to refuse
the relief sought would be to deprive them of property without due
process of law. The Court, however, dismissed their claims and decreed that the British Public Trustee was entitled to registration as
owner. The gist of ihe decision is found in the following extract
from the opinion of the Court:
I "Therefore, New Jersey having authorized this corporation like
others to issue certificates that so far represent the stock that ordinarily at least no one can get the benefits of ownership except through
and by means of the paper, it recognizes as owner anyone to whom
the person declared by the paper to be the owner has transferred it by
the indorsement provided for wherever it takes place. It allows an
"Cf. Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215 N. Y. 259, tog N. E. 250 (xgis),
as to the power of a court to compel a foreign corporation to transfer shares
on its books.
U445 Sup. Ct. 2o7 (925), affirming decree of District Court, reported in
.3oo Fed. 741 (1924). The case of Direction der Disconto-Geselischaft v. the'
same defendants was decided with the same opinion. Cf., Mitchell v. Leland,
supra, note 2o, in which a purchaser of certificates at a judicial sale'was denied relief, but solely on the ground that he had not come into equity with
clean hands.
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indorsement in blank, and by its law as well as by the law of England
an indorsement in blank authorizes anyone who is the lawful owner
of the paper to write in a name, and thereby entitle the person so
named to demand registration as owner in his turn upon the corporation's books. But the question of who is the owner of the
paper depends upon the law of the place where the paper is. It does
*not depend upon the holder's having given value or taking without
notice of outstanding claims but upon the things done being sufficient
.by the law of the place to transfer title. An execution locally valid
is as effectual as an ordinary purchase. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
R. R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U. S. io. The things done in England
transferred the title to the Public Trustee by English law."
That this decision answers thd above objection to the principles
of the preceding cases taking the newer .viewin so far as certificates
indorsed in blank are concerned is obvious. If the acts done in respect to the certificates pass title to them by the law 6f the jurisdiction where they are, e. g., by legal execution or seizure, such acts will
be recognized by the courts of the domicile of the corporation as entitling the holder in whom title so vested to riegistration as owner on
the books of the corporation..
It would seem, however, that the principle of this decision is
equally applicable to cases where the certificates seized are not indorsed in blank. Validity of the transfer of title by the law of the
jurisdiction in which -the transfer-by seizure, execution, or attachment-takes place, is made the test of the transferee's right to assert
.his ownership of the shares at the domicile of.the corporation. And
certainly good title to the certificates may be given in such proceedings without their being indorsed in blank.25
Thus, in the federal courts at least, a complete. chain of rights
has now been worked out on the modem and practical principles in
respect to stock certificates. Prior cases recognized the validity
of levies and attachments on certificates under local law; and the
present decision of the Supreme Court establishes the rights of holders who take title under such a levy or attachment to have effect given
to the title so acquired,-as rights in the shares, at the domicile of the
corporation.
Application of the principle of the Bank'fir Handel case will
undoubtedly give rise some day to a contest between conflicting rights
acquired against the stock in two jurisdictions-the jurisdiction having the certificates and the jurisdiction of the domicile of the corporation. This difficulty will have to be settled by the courts of the latter
.See,

Gen. Motors Gorp'n v. Ver Linden, supra, note ig. The Court

there says, "The.code provisions do not require that the shares of stock of
the defendant in. a corporation, shall be indorsed, and the ease with which the
defendant's property interest may be-liquidated, has to my mind, nothing to
do with the attachability of such interest." See also, Yazoo & Miss. Valley

1. R. Co. v. Clarksdale; "rupra,note

21.
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jurisdiction.

As -yet the question has not been passid upon.

It was

raised in Miller v. Kaliwerke, etc., Gcscllschaft,26 but as the claimant
having the certificates had failed to assert his rights in the way specificallk provided for the purpose, he lost on that ground, and the
question of the conflict of rights was not considered on its merits.
Arid in the Bank ffir Handel case, the question would have been
squarely raised if the United States Alien Property Custodian had
also claimed the stock by seizure at the domicile of the corporation.
But as he had asserted no claim, the Court expressly refused to consider the consequences of the possible conflict. This problem ihen
must remain for future solution. But the presence of this unsolved
problem should not deter other courts from following the Supreme
Court as far as it has gone in recognizing the practical status of
stock and stock certificates as the basis for their legal status.
H. C.A.
LIABILITY OF PROPERTY OWNERS FOR INJURY TO PERSONS
ENTERING THE PROPERTY IN AID OF ANOTHER-The liability of a

property o'wner for the injury of a person coming upon his property in the aid of another person already injured or in danger of in-

jury has been brought up again in a recent case in New York.'

In

that case the janitress of the defendant's apartment house fell

through a trapdoor left open in a darkened hallway. The feniale
plaintiff, responding to her cries for help, rushed into the building

and fell through the same opening. Upon suit by her husband and
herself the defense was made that she had been guilty of contributory
negligence in rushing into the hallway without pausing until her eyes
might become accustomed. to the darkness. The trial court adopted

this view and instructed the jury that the plaintiff had as a matter of
law been guilty of contributory negligence. TheAppellate Division,

however, finding that the owner was responsible for injuries received

by the plaintiff while aiding another negligently injured by him; held

that on the facts she could not be charged with contributory negligence as a matter of law, but that that fact would have to be deter-

mined by the jury.
The case follows a line of decisions in which an action for damages has been allowed a rescuer for injuries sustained in an effort to
save a person injured or in danger of injury by reason of the defendant's negligent conduct. The theory is that his injury is a proximate
result of the defendant's negligence toward the first party- injured.
Such an injury, although sustained by one not the person to whom.
the original duty of care extended but a third party, is a real possi" Supra, note 2o.
'Laufer v. Shapiro, 206 N. Y. Supp. 189 (19'4).
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bility, and one which in many situations can be foreseen as a probable
result of the original negligent conduct. The truth of this cannot be
shown more clearly than by the words of Cardozo, J., in Wagner v.
InternationalRailway Co.: 2 "Danger invitd rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It. recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the
natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the
imperilled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. The state that
leaves an opening in a bridge is, liable to the child that falls into the
stream, but liable also to the parent that plunges to its aid. -The railroad company whose train approaches without signal is a wrongdoer
toward the traveller surprised between the rails, but a wrongdoer also
to the bystander who drags him from the path."
Whether a recovery on this theory necessarily means that there
was any duty of care toward the rescuer himself independently of
that existing toward the party first injured is beyond the scope of this
note.8 But the authorities allowing a recovery on this basis are
numerous, and clearly indicate that this is the law in New York and
elsewhere. 4
In such a situation the plaintiff has been forced to think and act
quickly, without time for such full realization of the attendant risks
or the exercise of such care as the ordinary rules of contributory
negligence would require. Much more latitude must therefore be
given in what he will be permitted to do without becoming affected
with contributory negligence. Little more can be required than that
it shall have appeared to him that he had a fair chance to perform
the rescue attempted without at the same time sacrificing himself.
The usual requirement is simply that under the circumstances his
N. Y. 176, i8o (92).
'As to the cogate question of liability' toward one who, not in danger
of physical injury himself, is injured by the sight of the negligent injury of
another see: "Damages for Injury from Fright at the Sight of Another's
Peril," 73 U. OF P. L. R-v. 28o (Mar., 1925).
"Eckert v. Long Island R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 5o2 (1872) ;'Donahoe v. Wabash, etc., R. R., 83 Mo. 560o (1884); Spoon er v. D. L & W. R. R., iiS N.
Y. 22, 21 N. E. 696 (1889); Condiff v. K C., etc., R. R. Co., 45 Kans. 25A
25 Pac. 56z (x8gi) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Langendoif, 48 Ohio 316, 28 N. F.
172 (i89i) ; Gibney v. State, 137 -N. Y. X, 33 N. E. 142 (1893) ; Fox v. Oakland Consolidated St. Ry. Co., x8 Cal. 55, 5o Pac. -5 (x897); Maryland
Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 482, 42 Ail. 6o (898); West Chicago, St. Ry.
Co. v. Liderman, 187 Ill. 463, 58 N. E. 367 (9oo); Corbin v. City of Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 45 At. 1o7O (xgoo); Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Ridley. I14 Tenn. 727, 86 S. W. 6o6 ( io5) ; Miller v. Union Ry. Co., I9t N. Y.
77. 83 N. E. 583 (i9O), setbte; Perpich v. Leetonia Mining Co., 118 Min
5o8, 137 N. W. 12 (1912); Bond -v. B. & O R. R. Co., 82 W. Va. 557, 96
S. E. 932 (1918); Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Hibbs, 211 S. W. 287 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1919); Wagner v. Jnternatio'nal Ry. Co., 232 N. Y. x6, x33 N. E.
437 (1921). See 49 L. R. A. 715, note, and 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) xo6g, note.
'232
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act would not have appeared rash to prudent persons.' And this is
not altered by the fact that a sufficient time elapsed between the first
accident and the rescue for the rescuer to realize in some degree the
nature and extent of the risk he was taking. "It is enough that the.,
act, whether impulsive or deliberate, is the child of the occasion."
But what will be the decision where the owner of the property on
which the injury occurred has not been responsible for the harm to
the party first injured? There can be no recovery for the injury to
the would-be rescuer on the theory discussed above, for that is dependent on the defendants precedent negligence.7 But an actian may
possibly be had on- another basis, where the negligence of the defendant consists in intaining the normal entrances to his property
in a condition dangerous to persons rihfully
,t
mg them. "lhis is
based an analogy to the cases allowing a recovery to policemen and
firemen who have entered the property in the course of their duty
and hive been injured due to some fault of the landowner.
The vast majorty of the cases ton firemen, policemen,
etc, enteringthe property by virtue of a rigR independent of the invitatiion or consent of the owner "lcensees," and find no liability to
them if tey fall down elevator shaft, off roofs, etc., in the course
of their duty.2 But more recently it has been pointed out that a public oflicer ets
the property no more by virtue of the owvner's consent than by virtue of his invitafion, so that he cannot be designated
property by that term. As put by Professor Francs H. Boen:9
-"Ifthe publi oficer is not an Invitee beamse bis right to enter dos
not depend on an invitafiwi-extended to him and becamse he entem
em if sumnmned by the owner, in performaxn of his duty as pubB e
and t" in cceptance of the iito
it is equally clear
dat he is not a Mcensee of the owner, since his entry is no mre efera&e to a permxsios
tmhan to an initafion. Such an ufBcer May
be entitled
the same, or to a less or greaterprotection tan a
znsee has the right to demand, but the mesure of care owing to
Mim cannot be satisfactorily determined by calling hima a licensee,
v. LmgLAnd R. C.. =PMonte 4,at p.6. The law as
i not impwe ueggevme to an
cifot to prerue
m
imlss made under swh efircmstraxes as to constitute
iadlaes, im the judgment of prodent pmnss
Set-- in accord. the mses
eted upm. note 46 and also Lineban v. SakvsaN, r26 Xass So6 (it);
PeOwnk Co.
. Roney, 89 Ind&45 (zf);.BeU% ConrMu
ei4zse.S4ee
SIE"

-aM

a irwgard for bumu fife that it

.
"WatUer v. aetuatinml Ranway. wtm, note 4.at p. IR~. See Da Rim
T- __sm .Co,41 Mont.I r S PBar 69 (1910).

' Ervasvie & CR. P Co. v. Wllatt. nr it.za (zaft); Corbi v. pl'L -

dd .ssP
See xgA.ILi
4.Rar Citedl; BOM
13 A.1%
T,. uote4.
P.. ft note,
andt ae them'

Okses Wort ts.

*"TeDut of a ladlord Toward Thoe &tering His PremIe of
TWer Own Right," 69 U. oF P. Lw. P4z. z4ft
, 34o, at Pe 344.
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after elaborately and conclusively demonstrating that his right does
not depend on the owner's consent, upon which the status of 'licensee'
depends as fully as that of 'business invitee'."' 0
It is on this principle thaf the leading case of Meiers v. Fred
Koch Brewing Co."1 is based. There it is decided that, since the
officer is there lawfully, he has the right to expect that the means of
entrance, designated as such to the owner's business invitees, will1 be
in a condition fit for use by him in the same manner as by them. '
And when an individual (there being no intimation of officious
.meddling) is perforing a duty ordinarily performed by a public
official or one of a similar nature, the duty of the landowner should
be the same toward him as it would be toward the official if he were
performing the duty?'
That these two bases of recovery are fundamentally distinct
cannot be doubted; the one arises primarily from the breach of a duty
to the person first injured; the other is based entirely on the breach
6f a duty toward the rescuer. The paramount right of the rescuer to
enter and aid is entirely independent of the cause of injury to the
party to be rescued and the negligence of the owner.of the property
in connection with it. A fireman enters to put out a fire irrespective
of the cause, and the duty that the entrances be free from dangerous
traps must be the same in either case. The interne on the ambulance
knows nothing of the cause of the injury to the party he seeks, and
the duty toward him will not vary therewith. But an action by a
rescuer on the theory that his injury is a proximate result of the
owner's negligence toward the party first injured is based upon a
ground of recovery much more narrow in this respect, for it limits
itself to those-instances where there has been actual fault on the part
of the landowner 1 4 On the other hand, it is riot. as is the former
theory, limited to situations arising out of a negligent maintenance
of the approaches to a property but applies to all forms of negligence,
See also, taking the same position. Prof. Leon Green, "Landowner v.

Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort" 21
Micr.
L REv.Y.495
122;9-N.
10, (Mar.,
127 N.1923).
F_ 491 (i92o).
' The Koch case is not on its facts contra to the cases referred to supra,
note 8, with the possible exception of Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Fryar,
132 Tenn. 612. 179 S. NV. t27 (r915), if its doctrine is limited, as is suggested
by Prof. Bohlen, 69 U. P. L. REv. 350 et seq., to injuries arising fromn the
defective maintenance of the prepared approaches and entrances to a property,
for there the owner has reason to. expect a use by outsiders, as is not true
as to the interior portions. In the last analysis the leading case of Learoyd
v. Godfrey, 138 Mass.'315 (i885), seems to be entirely in accord with this.
U Supra, note 9, at page 343. In Kohn v. Lovett. 44 Ga. 25! (1871), and

Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Pa. 74 (878).

recovery for injuries for civilian res-

cuers were denied on the same reasoning as it was denied to officials, the injuries having been sustained in the interior parts of the properties.

USupra, noie 7.

NOTEr

to which the former theory could not extend. And there is another
difference in respect to the time of the attempt to aid. Where the
theory is that of proximate result the attempt to aid must necessarily
occur relatively soon after the first injury, but where action is on the.
theory of the property owner's duty to all persons on his property
as of right, there would seem to be no limit on the time within which
the attempt and injury must occur. The amount of care required
of the rescuer must under either theory vary with the facts in each
case and depend on the apparent need for immediate action on his
part.
The two problems are entirely distinct, and, although the law
of New York allows a recovery in both situations, the instant case
and the line of cases on which it is based are not authorities for the
other principle. Anything that may be said for or against the general
duties of a landowner to a person entering the land in aid of an
injured person thereon, or for any other public purp6se, cannot be
taken to oppose or criticize the theory on which recoveries may be
allowed for injuries which are in the particular cases proximate results of the landowner's original negligence. Nor can a limitation
placed upon an action based upon the proximate result of previous
negligence be regarded as an infringement on the doctrines laid down
as to the right of entering rescuers in general1 I
E. E. M., Jr.
SEARCH AND

SETZURE WITHOUT A WARRANT.-The

Fourth

Amendment to the Federal Constitution': "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the piersons or things to be seized."-"is nothing more or less
than a declaration of the English common law as it existed or was
presumed to exist at the time of the adoption of that instrument." 2
For about seventy years prior to 1763 the practice had been general
in England of issuing "general warrants," which authorized the
officers of the Crown to search all suspected places and seize all
"The

fact that these problems are separate and independent appears to

have been overlooked by the learned author of the note on -the instant case
in 34 YALE L. J. 330 (Jan., x925).
'The Fourth Amendment is a restriction on the powers of the Federal
Government. Barron v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S, 1833).
Almost every state in the United States has the same or a substantially similar
provision in the state constitution. The states and the sections of their con"stitutions are listed in 34 HAzv. L Rv. -366.

'Arbitrary Searches and Seizures as Applied to Modem Industry, A. A.
Bruce, i8 Green Bag 273.
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suspected persons. These warrants were used by the King and his
officials to suppress seditious libels, fcihunt out the perpetrators of
the libels, and secure the means for convicting them by obtaifling
their letters and other private papers. These general warrants were
declared illegal in the case of John Wilkes, Esq., V. Robert Wood,
Esq., and a search warrant to search for private papers was declared
illegal by Lord Camden in the case of John Entick v. Nathan Carrington and Three Other Messengers in Ordinary to the King.' At
about the same time, the "Writs of Assistance" were used in the colony of Massachusetts Bay to enforce the revenue laws and seize
smuggled goods in any suspected place, and aroused general opposition and irritation among the colonists.5 These occurrences led to the
insertion in the Federal Bill of Rights of the provisions contained in
the Fourth Amendment.
It is significant that the amendment is in two parts: one part providing imnunity from "unreasonable searches and seizures," and the
other part providing for special warrants and prohibiting general
(John Doe) warrants. The right to.arrest, without a warrant, as it
existed'at common law, has been held to be not unreasonable.6 The
right to search the body of a person legally arrested, for weapons and
the means of committing crime, without a warrant, has been sustained, as not unreasonable.' The search of persons entering the
country, including h6me-coming citizems, without warrant, has been
sustained on the theory of national self-protection. 8 These several
examples illustrate that not every search and seizure without a warrant is prohibited and.when so made may not be unreasonable.
The same Congress, which formulated and submitted the first
ten amendments to the states for approval, passed an act to regulate
the collection of customs duties.. This act provided for search and
seizure of goods subject to duty when concealed in a ship or vessel,
and for search and seizure of goods subject to duty, on the issuance
a9iHowell's State Trials xiS4 (x763).
'19 Howell's State Trials o3o (1765).
'Paxton's Case, Quincy's Mass. Rep. Sr (1761)..
* Wakely v. Hart el al., 6 Binney 316 (Pa., 184).
"'The basic principle is this: search of the person is unlawful when the
seizure of the body is a trespass and the purpose of the search is to discover
grounds as yet unknown fQr arrest or accusation (Entick v. Carrington,
.supra). Scrch of the person becomes lawful when grounds for arrest and
accusation have been discovered, and the law is in the act of subjecting the
body of the accused to its physical domiizon. . .. The immunity is not
from all search and seizure, but'from search and seizure unreasonable in the
light of common law traditions." "Cardozo, ., in People v. Chiagles, 237'
N. Y. 193, x92 N. F_ 583 (t923).
'Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in Carrol and Kiro v. U. S., 45 SuP. Ct. 28
(1925).
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of a search warrant, when concealed in a house or building.' The
framers of the amendments evidently did not regard a search and
seizure without 'a search warrant for concealed dutiable goods, when
made in a movable vessel, as unreasonable, and provided a different
means of search for the same articles in a house or dwelling. This
contemporaneous construction has persuasive force.
"Fishing expeditions," whether with or without warrants, to get
evidence in order to charge a person with some offense have been
condemned as unreasonable. Boyd v. United States 10 held, that
"when the compelling a man to be a witness against himself is the
very object of a search and seizure of his private papers, it is an
unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition." " A man's house is hi castle, and a search
of a house without a wairant, whether for contraband property '1 or
for private papers,' 3 is unreasonable. "Search warrants may not be
used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and
papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence
to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but .
.
they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search
and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the
complainant may have in the property to be seized or in the right to
the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power
renders' possession of the property by the accused unlawful and
provides that it may be taken." 14 Stolen goods, burglar's tools,
forged or counterfeit notes. implements of gambling, excisable articles. intoxicating liquor illegally possessed and implements for its
IrSTAT. AT L. 29, sec. 24: "That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in
which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed: and therein to search for, seize and secure
any such goods, wares or merchandise; and if they have cause to suspect a
concealment thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or
other place, they or either of them shall- upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house,
store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such
goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial; and
all such goods, wares and merchandise, on which the duties shall not have
been paid or secured, shall be forfeited."
Cf. 1I STAT. AT L. 178, sec. 3 (Search of Vehicles and Persons) and 2
STAT. AT L, 40 (Warrant to Search Dwelling'House or Other Place) which
continue this distinction in the enforcement of the collection of customs duties. The first was referred to and treated as operative in Cotzhausen v.
Nazro, 107 U. S. 215 (1882).

'*i6 U. S. 616 0886).
nBlack's American Constitutional Law, (2d ed.) So6.
"Liquor-Amos v. U. S., 255 U. S. 313 (1921).
' Contracts-Gouled v. U. S.. 2.;5 U. S. 298 (920. Papers-Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385 (i92o).
" Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
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manufacture, and lottery tickets are aimong the most important articles as to which searches and seiiures, with warrants, have been
sustained.15
8
In the recent case of Carrol and Kiro v. United States,"
a further illustration of the validity of a search and seizure without a
warrant is furnished. Carrol and Kiro, the defendants below, were
introduced to several prohibition officers (the latter using fictitious
names) on September 29, i921, and agreed to sell the officers some
whiskey; the defendants went in their automobile from the officers'
apartment to their source of supply in East Grand Rapids, but soon
returned without any whiskey. Defendants were observed in their
car on the highway by the officers on October 6th. On December
i5th, the officers observed them on"the road from Detioit to Grand
Rapids, followed them, ordered the car to be stopped, searched the
car, discovered intoxicating liquor, and-arrested the defendants."
The defendants were indicted for unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act." The defendants objected to the use of the liquor seized as evidence, as the
search made by the officers was unlawful2
"Boyd v. U. S.. z16 U. S. 616 (886);

Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Mete.

329 (Mass., 184); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, (7th ed.) 432-

Sup'. Ct. 280 (1s2).
"?The officers acted under the National Prohibition Act, 41 STAT. AT L
3o5, Title II,'section 26: "When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors,
or any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting
in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile,
water or aircraft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all
intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law.
Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or possessed illegally shall be
seized by an officer he shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat. air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any
person in charge thereof . . .
Section 25 provides: "It shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor
or property designed for the manufacture of liquor intended for use in violating this title or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist
in any such liquor or property." This section also provides for search warrants to search private'dwellings under certain conditions.
i 4 1 -STAT. AT L 3o5, Title II, sec. 3.
U"Even
assuming the invalidity of the search and seizure, is the evidence obtained by the officers as a result thereof nevertheless admissible at
the trial of the defendants? Upon this question there exist two diverse lines
of opinion. The one view is that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional
seizure is admissible the same as any other evidence secured by illegal means,
and the only remedy of the injured person is a civil or criminal action against
the offending officer or official. . . . The opposing view makes the evidence
inadmissible if obtained through an unreasonable search or seizure, . . . in
order better, as it is assumed, to preserve inviolate the constitutional right."
Stern and Gordon, JJ., in Commonwealth v. Street and Street, 3 Pa. D.
& C. 783 (1Q23). The Federal courts take the latter view. See also Hoyer
v. State, 180 Wis. 4o7, 193 N. W. 89 (923).
The question therefore was
squarely presented whether the search was lawful and valid.
345

NOTES

The Supreme Court of the United States, per Taft, C. J. (McReynolds and Sutherland, JJ., dissenting), held the search was lawful. "The true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid." 2 0 The
court was helped in the formation of this rule by the contemporaneous exposition of the amendment by the First Congress, as mentioned above, and by the fact that only unreasonable searches are
prohibited.2 1 This rule does not allow every vehicle on the highway to be stopped and searched, but "the measure of legality of such
a seizure is . . . that the seizing officer shall have reasonble or
probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and
seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported." 2 2 Further, in disposing of the argument that the right to
search should rise no higher than the right to arrest, and, as there
was no right to arrest in this case without a warrant, that therefore
the search was unlawful, the court said: "The right to search and the
validity of .the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest: they
are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for be2
lief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law."
The court came to the conclusion that on the facts as given above and
from their judicial notice that the road, which the defendants were
using, led from the Canadian border, a notorious place of rum-runcause and were therefore justified in
ning, the officers had probable
2
'the search and seizure. '
At first blush, the rule announced by the court may appear too
sweeping. It may be contended that it gives the officers of the government too much power to interfere with the liberty of the individual and his property by unreasonable searches and seizures.
The support derived from the contemporaneous interpretation in the

'Page 283.
SPage 283.
n Page 2M6

"Page 287.
"The dissenting opinion was based on these grounds: I. A criminal stat-

ute must be strictly construed and "shall discover . . .in act of transporta-

tion" cannot mean "shall have reasonable cause to suspect or believe that
such transportation is being carried on ;" 2. Unreasonableness depends on the
means adopted and as the seizure followed an unlawful arrest, the seizure
became unlawful-, 3. The facts known by the officers were insufficient to create a reasonable belief that the defendants were transporting liquor contrary
to law.
The majority opinion held that "discover" was not limited to that information derived from actually seeing the contraband, but adopted the
broader definition given in Commonwealth v. Street and Street, 3 Pa. D. &
C. 783 (0923)-"an uncovering, a revealing, or exploring."
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customs duties act may be met by the argument that Congress has
practically unchecked control over matters of taxation and revenue,
in order to carry on the government properly and efficiently, but that
the National Prohibition Act is a "police" statute, to which the same
rule should not apply.23 As to the argument that the search is directed at that which is contraband, in the course of transportation
and subject to forfeiture or destruction, it may be objected that "this
is the same specious reason given in colonial days in support of general warrants for search and seizure of smuggled goods, and loses
sight of the right of security of persons and their possessions against
searches and seizures and makes the thing sought for seizure the
controlling idea.",
As a practical matter, it is very probable that the power given
by this rule to the police may be abused and every automobile stopped,
under the theory that the end justifies the means employed.'? It is
obvious that one law should not be broken in ordei'to help enforce
another. The probable cause may be "meagre." 2s Right to redress
in the aggrieved citizen is usually difficult of proof and his recovery
of damages is very improbable. On the other hand, to require an
officer to get a search warrant for an automobile which he reasonably believes is being used in the illegal traffic would be inadequate.
It would be as difficult to catch the speeding automobile used in the
'Murray's
S. 185s).

Lessee, et at. v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 18 How. 274 (U.

"Wiest, J., in People v. Case, 22o Mich. 379, i9o N. W. 289 (x922). In
this case, the sheriff searched every automobile on the grounds of t.public
fair for intoxicating liquor, and the defendant was arrested after liquor was
found in his car. The court, by a vote of 5 to 3,upheld. the search as not
unreasonable. The quotation given above is from the dissenting opinion. In
Hoyer v. State, iSo Wis. 407, 193 N. IV. 89 (i923), an automobile was in a
collision, which caused some of the bottles contained in the car to break, and
the car was left at the side of the road; an 6fficer later smelled the suspicious odor and searched the car to trace the odor to its source. Held, that
this was an unreasonable search: "The situation presented to these officers at
the time they entered the automobile and took its contents was one which,
at the most. might have justified the issuance of a search warrant by a
magistrate. The granting of. such a writ, however, is a matter for judicial
determination and not within the. much more limited field of the discretion
vested in executive or administrative officers."
" It is not tinreasonable for a prohibition enforcement officer to stop
automobiles upon the public highway and search them for intox.cating liquors
without a warrant and the finding of the liquor justifies the search." U. S.
v. Bateman, 279 Fed. 23! (D. C, x922).
"It is not and cannot be the law in criminal cases that an illegal arrest
or search could be legalized b.,the'finding of evidence that a crime had been
committed, for a search or arrest illegal to begin with remains illegal and
no injury should be allowed to flow to the defendant by reason of his submission to it." U. S. v. Rembert, 284 Fed. 996 (D.C, x922).
Cf. U. S v. Rembert, 284 Fed. 996 (D. C, 1922).

NOTES

transportation of liquor as for the hare to lose the race to the tortoise when the hare stayed awake and ran towards the goal. How
wisely this rule will work and be worked remains to be seen.

H.W.S.
IS THE OPERATION OF A STREET RAILWAY BY A MUNICIPALITY
THE EXERCISE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.-It is established law

that municipal corporations possess a dual nature.' They perform
some acts which are governmental in charicter and others which
are pnvate. When a city exercises the sovereignty delegated to it by
the state, it acts in a govemniental or sovereign capacity. When it
exercises its corporate power, it acts in a privafe (also called ministerial or proprietary) capacity.. In the first instance the city is
regarded by the law as a sovereign; in the latter instance as a legal
individual
"Familiar examples of governmental duties are the duty of preserving the peace, and the protection of property from wrongdoers,
the construction of highways, the protection -of health, and the prevention of nuisances." 2 Thus the city acts in a governmental capacity in passing ordinances, in maintaining courts, in furnishing police and fire protection, and in building streets3 On the other hand
the city acts in its corporate capacity in operating gas, water and
electric light plants,' and in furnishing its citizens commodities such
as ice, coal and liquor.
It is sometimes hard to draw a distinction between the two kinds
of city powers, since it has been the tendency of the courts to enlarge the governmental function. The question arises most often in
the law of torts. When'the city acts as a sovereign, In a governmental act, it cannot be sued for the torts of its employees; but it is
responsible, as any other legal individual, for the acts of its agents in
the exercise of its private functions. The courts have been prone
to relieve the city of liability in acts imposed by the state or done
in a spirit of benevolence towards its residents, and so have been
lUoyd v. New York, 5 N. Y. 369, 374 (i85x). I McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, sec. 871. Pond, Public Utilities, ch. IL

'Hart v. Bridgeport, Fed. Cas. No. 6149"(1876). The court said: "Execution of these duties is undertaken by the government because there is a
universal obligation resting upon the government to protect all its citizens,
and because the prevention of crime, the preservation of health, and the construction of means of inter-communication are benefits in which the whole
community is alike and fully interested."
'See White, Negligence of Municipal Corporations, sec. 25, where cases
are cited which show the extent to which courts have gone in defining a-governmental act.
' For cases showing examples of private acts of municipalities in all
states see Pond, Public Utilities, sec. 265.
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forced to call many doubtful acts governmental in nature." Again,
the question arises when the federal government attempts to tax the
employees of a city. The courts have called certain functions governmental to exempt them from such taxation. Probably the most
recent occurrence of such an interpretation is in the case of Frey v.
Woodworth." In this case the federal district court came to the conclusion that the city of Detroit operated its municipal street car
system as a part of its governmental function. Said the court: "The
street car system of' a modern city whether its cars are operated
upon the surface, overhead, or underground, constitutes the veins
and arteries of the *city, necessary to its very life. Upon its proper
functioning depends inevitably the efficiency of government in preserving the peace, protecting property and health, and preventing
nuisances.. Without it the city cannot exist. Without it the government cannot function in any of its essential respects."
If this eulogy to the modern street railway system could be
concurred in, there is little doubt that the operation of street railways should be classed as a governmental act. But it loses force
when compared with other decisions. It is doubtful if a railway
system contributes so much to the prevention of crime as the-electric lighting system of a city, or so much to health as the furnishing
of pure water. Yet these functions are decidedly within the private.
powers of a city. In the case of Illinois Trust and Savings Bank v.
Arkansas City ' the court -said: "In contracting for water works to
supply itself and its inhabitants with water, the city is not exercising
its governmental or legislative powers. The purpose ot such a contract is not to govern its inhabitants, but to obtain a private benefit
for the city itself and its denizens." This language has been adopted
in a later federal caseO As a basis for these decisions, an earlier
case had defined the private functions of a city as those which
benefit the corporation, or give comfort to its citizens, "those things
not exercised in the discharge of those general and recognized duties which are undertaken by the government." -So in the case of
'But in the recent case of Fowler v. Cleveland, ioo Ohio i58, 126 N. E,
72 (igxg) the court held the city liable for the negligence of a fire truck
driver.

The court said the city exercised its governmental function by a

ministerial act. This doubtful opinion shows a reaction against the exemption of municipalities from tort liability. See 34 H.Av; L. REv. 66,5 Coaz
L Rav. 9D.

'2 Fed. (2d) 725 (D. C., 1924), where it was held that te

salary of a

mot6rman on the municipal street railway was exempt from the federat mcome tax. -

'76 Fed. 271 (C. C. A., z1 9 6).
'Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha; 147 Fed.
(C. C. A., i9o6).
'Hart v. Bridgeport, supra, note 2. -Yet it need not be said that no new
function 'of the state would be governmental Fire protection by the state
is a modern exercise of a function formerly private.

NOTES

South Carolina v. United States,0 it was held that the state system
for dispensing liquor was the exercise of a proprietary pover, even
though it was strongly argued that it was an exercise of the state's
police power. It seems ridiculous to say that a municipal railway
system is not more to the advantage of the compact community which
it serves than to the government at large.
The case of Frey v. Woodworth rejects several tests which
other courts have used to distinguish municipal functions. In a
leading case, Bailey v. New. York, 11 the court said that a municipal
waterworks was established "as well for the private emolument and
advantage of the city as for the public good. The state, in its sovereign character, has no interest in it. The investment and profits
are the private property of the city." The conclusion, invariably, accepted, was that a public work maintained for private advantage and
emolument was a private function of the city, though the public derived a common benefit from it. So it has been held that the city
acts in its governmental capacity in maintaining parks, zoos, and Incineration plants, since it gains no profit therefrom.12 This is a doubtful test at best and has been questioned in recent decisions. 5 However, Frey.v. Woodworth rejected it entirely, so that the' opinion of
the court, that the profit from the railway was wholly incidental,
need not be questioned.2' Nor would the court hear the argument
that a mandatory act put upon the city by the state was a governmental function, while its permitted acts were private, although there
is authority for this distinction. 5 Two recent Louisiana cases, Jones
v. New Orleans," and Davis v. New Orleans Belt R. R.,1" have
19g U. S. 437 0905).
13 Hill 53i (N. Y., 18 4 2).
"See McQuillin: Municipal Corporations, sec. 2672. It is generally held

that city parks are maintained by the city in the exercise of its governmental

capacity on the grounds of failure of profit. Comelisen v. Atlanta, ig Ga.
App. 436, 91 S. E. 415 (97); see L R. A. 1915C 435, note. The rule has
been applied to a bathing beach, Nemet v. Kenosha, i69 Wis. 379, x72 N. W.
711 (91g); to street sweeping, Harris v. District Of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650
(x92), in which there is a dissent; and to incineration, Snider v. City of
High Point, 168 N. C. 6o8, 85 S..E. IS (1915). These latter cases might be
sustained on grounds of promoting health, but it seems that in the case of
parks an analogy to ancient commons would be more plausible.

"Supra, note 5.

"However, the profit gained from the operation of a railway can hardly
bd called incidental, such as fees charged by a court. If the operation of the
system were certainly a governmental function as it is in the case of ferries,
then an incidental profit would change the character of the act. See U. S.
v. King, infra, note 2o. The opposite has been suggested in regard to maintaining parks for profit: see Comelisen v. Atlanta, supra, note iz.

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, see. 26.
143 La. 1073, 79 So. 865 (sxp8).
t155 La. 504, 99 So. 419 (1923).
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held that the operation of a belt railroad imposed on the city by
statute was the exercise of a governmental function, while similar
operation under a permissive power was a private business of the
city. These cases might Well have been considered in Frey v. Woodworth, but that court, in order to reach its decision, did not heed the
usual test mentioned above, nor did it long consider the relation between a railway system and other public works. The true basis of
its conclusion was the analogy it forced between street railways and
highways.
The construction and maintenance of highways have always
been within a city's governmental power because in early common

law they were the King's highways, necessary for the passage of his
troops.18 Modern law has accepted this tradition and applied it to
city streets without the need of showing the relation of highways
to present-day government. Within the tradition were bridges and
ferries, as extensions of highways. 9 In reaching its decision in
Frey v. Woodworth, the court relied strongly on United States v.

King, 20 a case which held that the municipal operation'of ferries was
a governmental function. The court decided that since the state's
sovereign power over highways had been extended to ferries, it was
logical to extend it to street railways. The court reasoned that the
term "highway" was to be interpreted in the light of progress, and
that the advance of civilization had extendid the application of the
word from path to road, to ferry, and finally to railway, so that
tbday a railway was a common highway. But the analogy between
ferries and railways will not hold, for the law as to ferries is an
ancient traditi6n, and not- a modern extension. Without this explanation, however, it is far easier to conceive of ferries as "floating
highways" than to consider railways as common roadways.1
22
Cases discussing the relationship of railways to highway3
have occurred especially in New York, seeking to determine if railway systems are matters of public use. In the oft-cited -case of
Sun Printing and Publicity Association v. Mayor of New York,u it

was said that a railroad was a highway necessary for the common
welfare of the people, and public in character. The opinion has
been quoted to show that railways were ordinary highways. But
SMcQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 227; 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, (5th ed.) secs. 5122, 1-155.
'McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, see. 4o6.

"28I Fed. 686 (C. C. A., z922). Ferries have been called "floating highways." Patterson v. Wollman, 'S N. D. 6o8, 67 N. W. o4o- (1896).
'The cases point'oit the distinction that ferries bear all the kinds of
traffic found on the highways, while railways carry'an exclusive class.
23 Dillon,. Municipal Corporations, (5th ed.) sec. 1294; Nellis, Street
Railways, (2d ed.) secs.'6,. a4.
" 152 N. Y. 2s7, 46 N. . 499 (z897).
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it must be noticed that this case decided only that a street railway

system was a matter of public use and that its construction was a
city purpose. This does not aid the conclusion that a railway system is a governmental purpose,2 ' for many proprietary acts of a

municipality have been held public uses.2" The case of In re
Board of Rapid Transit Commissioners2 considered the latter case,
and held that a subway was built and belonged to the city as a proprietor, not as a sovereign. 27 As this was followed by Linsheimer
v. Underpinning and Foundation Company,2" there is no doubt that
the New York courts would have reached a decision opposite to that
of Frey zv. Woodworth. The recent case of Tobin z. Seattle 29 is directly in point, deciding that the city of Seattle operates its municipal railway in its proprietary capacity, and owes its patrons the
duties of a private corporation. In accord is Davis v. New Orleans
Belt R. R.3 1 In Bird v. Detroit,"' it was held that authority to construct a highway was not authority to construct a street railway. It.
seems a far stretch of the imagination to interpret a statute authorizing construction and maintenance of a highway as power "to pave
a road with two streaks of steel" and run street cars thereon. Yet
some courts threaten to call a municipal street railway the King's,
or "Commonwealth's, highway.

It seems obvious that street railway systems must be classed
with water works and electric lighting plants as proprietary func'The court said that to leave the railway in private hands was "rather
in accord with our American form of government which leaves trade
and
commerce to be carried on by individuel industry and enterprise."
'Linn v. Chambersburg, i6o Pa. 5i, 28 At. 842 (x894),- electric light
plant; Jones v. Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917), fuel jard; Egan v. San
Francisco, x65 Cal. 576, 133 Pac. 294 (1913), opera house. See Pond, Public
Utilities, ch. IV.
"197 N. Y. 81, go N. E. 456 (gog).
The New York courts go to unusual lengths to show that a railway
is not an ordinary use of a road and thus is additional servitude. Although
this is not the accepted view, it does .not weaken their distinction between
governmental and private functions. [See 36 L R. A. (N. S.) 677, 709].
:lectric light poles and water pipes are nbt additional servitude: Palmer v.
Larchmont Electric Co., i58 N. Y. 231, 52 N. E. jo9 (899). It was well
said that a city controlled street cars because it controlled the streets, nbt
because they came within its governmental capacity: City of New York v.
Brooklyn City R. R., 232 N. Y. 413, 134 N. E. 533 (19=).
1178 App. Div. 495, 165 N. Y. Supp." 645 (1917).
127

Wash. 664,

e Supra, note 17.

221

Pac. 583 (:9z3).

31 z48 Mich. 71, irz N. IV. 86o (19o7).
But even if it should be agreed,
as argued in a dissenting opinion, that a railway was a necessary use of the
street and that the city's power over streets should grow with its needs,
it is not -admitted that the -exercise of such power would be governmentag
See Davis v. New York, 14 N. Y. 5o6 (1856).
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tions of a city. Careful search of the books has revealed no authority contrary to this view. Progress has made street railways
public highways in the sense that they are for all the public to ride
on, but it has not made them the peculiar concern of the state in its
sovereign capacity. Without regard to the test of whether they are
run for profit or by order of the state, it seems plain that they
are not necessary to government. The state does not govern its people by means of its street railways. It is submitted that this, after
all, should be the final test of a governmental function, and that the
tendency to free municipal corporations from liability by calling all
kinds of acts essential governmental functions should not be indulged.
W. F.C.
ERRONEOUS PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS BINDING IN SUBSEQUENT
APPEALS IN THE SAME CASE.-When an appellate court reverses the
decision of a trial court and sends the case back for a new trial, in

accordance with the principles of law it has laid down for the future guidance of the trial court, it is generally stated that, if the
issues remain the same, such principles of law govern the case in all
its subsequent stages, and will not be reconsidered on a later appeal.'
In short, these rulings are said to become the law of that case, binding upon
the parties until the final conclusion of the particular liti2
gation.

That the law as thus laid down by the appellate court is, in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances,3 binding upon the trial
court, admits of little question.4 Any other holding would be fatal

to our entire system of appeals, for if the trial court could with
impunity disregard the superior judgment of an upper court,-the
purpose of the appeal, which is to correct errors, would be entirely

frustrated.' A very recent illustration of the doctrine of the law of
the case as applied to the trial court is afforded by the case of Wil'Supervisors' v. Kennicott, _94 U. S. 498 (1876); National Surety Co.
v. Long, 8s Ark. x58, io7 S. W. 384 0 9o8); Buck Stove & Range Co. Y.
Vickers, 8o Kan. 29, ioi Pac. 668 (gog).
24 C. J., 1093.
'Thus it has been held that if the supreme court of the jurisdiction has,
since the enunciation of the law by an intermediate appellate court, declared
the law to be different, in another case, the trial.court should follow the law
as laid down by the supreme court. Barton v. Thompson, 56 Iowa 571 (i88i).
To hold otherwise would lead to. most "illogical results." Lerulla v. Supreme
Lodge, 223 Ill. S8, 79 N. E. 6p (1906). But see, contra, District of CoL
v. Brewer, 32 App. (D. C.) 388 (i9o9).

'McClellan v. Crook, 7 Gill. 333 (Md., I18) ; Dodge v. Gaylord, 53 Ind.
365 (1876).
'Supra, note 4.
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liam Wrigley, Jr. Company v. L. P. Larson, Jr. Company,' where
the Circuit Court of Appeals on a second appeal decided that the
L. P. Larson, Jr. Company was entitled to an injunction to restrain

further simulation of its product, and to an accounting of all profits
realized from the illegal manufacture and sale of the simulated product by the Wrigley Company. The case was returned to the.District Court for further proceedings, and there the Wrigley Company sought to question the mandate of the Circuit Court as regarded "all profits," on the ground that in deciding this the upper
court went beyond what was necessary for the determination of the
issue before it, and it was contended that only profits derived from
common territory should be accounted for. On the principle of the
law of the case, however, the District Court-held that the decree
was binding upon it in its entirety, even admitting the contentions
advanced.
The effect of the principle of the law of the case, it is declared;
is to preclude consideration on a second or third appeal of what was
decided on the first appeal." The desirability of bringing litigation
to as speedy a close as possible is held to make necessary some rule
of practice which obviates the possibility of recurrent discussion of
decided points.8 If the earlier ruling is sound in point of law therq
is little, if any, objection to such a rule of practice.' But suppose
the law of the case as set forth on the first appeal by the upper
court is of doubtful correctness, or admittedly erroneous. Can the
appellate court reopen the question and correct the error, or is the
rule of the law of the case such an inflexible one as to close discussion of the question forever, so that the court'cannot rectify its
mistake in order that the determination of the cause may then proceed on a sound basis?
The question as thus presented discloses the difference of opinion which has arisen in the courts due to two ponflicting aims--one,
'United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, East-

ern Division; March x4, 1925.
"'The purpose of the rule is to cut off any inquiry at all into the rightfulness or wrongfulness thereof;" dissenting opinion in Brewer v. Browning, xiis
Miss. 358, 376, ,6'So. 267 (917).
'Roberts v. Cooper, 2o How. 467 (U. S., 1857) ; Stacy v. Vermont Central Railroad Co., 32 Vt. 551 (86o); Strehlau v. John Schroeder Lumber
Co.,

152

Wis. 589, 142 N. W.

x2o (1913).

'In many of the cases, it is submitted, the court on second appeal
firmly felt that the prior ruling was correct, and employed the doctrine of
the law of-the case as a convenient method of obviating discussion of the

question for the purpose of expediting the progress of the cause.

See cases

cited in note x, .supra. Evidence of this aspect of the doctrine-is had in the
case of Kiley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Rwy. Co., 142 Wis. 154, 125 N. W.
464 (igio), where on second appeal the court held that the decision on the
first appeal holding constitutional a statute which did away with the fellowservant doctrine had become the law of the case; but the court then went
on to give its reasons why the act was constitutionaL

426

UVFERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

the desire to end litigation without undue delay, even at the cost of
a decision based upon erroneous legal principles; 10 the other, to decide the issue justly, even if it is necessary to prolong the ultimate
culmination by going back over trodden ground and starting anew,
with unobjectionable principles of law as a guide."On principle, it would seem that the aim of our judicial system should be, not so much thi expeditious handling of litigation, but
rather the disposition of litigation by the rendition of just decisions,
and it is submitted that where on a second appeal the appellate court
is convinced that palpable error was committed on the first appeal
in laying down the law of the case, the policy which is said. to require such a rule should give way to the circumstances of the situation, in order that the proper law12may then be declared. 12 In the language of Mr. Justice Holmes, "In the hbsence of statute, the
phrase 'law of the case,' as applied to the effect of. previous orders
on the action of the court rendering them in the same case, merely
expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what
has been decided, not a limit to their power."
While the modem tendency is undoubtedly the other way,"'
the weight of authority seems to be that what was decided on the
first appeal, although unquestionably erroneous, is the law of the
case and cannot be changed. 5 Most of the reasons advanced in the
cases which hold this position, it is repectfully submitted, are entirely unsatisfactory. _ Invoking the rule of the law of the case
under the circumstances here under consideration is sought to be
justified on such grounds as that the matter is res adjudicata,1 that
"The thought that there must be some end to litigation has appeared
especially in the California decisions; in fact it may be said that the doctrine
of the law of the.case as of binding force has become firinily fixed in that jurisdiction. Leese v. Clark, 2o Cal. 387 (1862) ; Allen v. Bryant, 155 Cal. 251,.

ioo Pac. 704 (igog). For a discussion and criticism of the California decisions see an article in 67 CEN RA. LAW JOURNAL 255.
.Railway Co. v. Merrill, 65 Kan. 436, 70 Pac. 358 (19o2); Leckendorf

U. S. 44S (i9x2); Brewer v. Browning, iiS Miss. 358, 76
In Aubrey v. Almy, 4 Ohio 524 (1855), in answer to the
argument that failure to adhere to the previous ruling of .the court as the
v. Steinfeld.
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So. 267 (1917).

law of the case would result in delay in the decision of the case, the court
said, "however inconvenient in practice this may be, we do not perceive how
it can be avoided if we find the judgment to be erroneous."

" Henry v. The Atchison, Topeka "& Saute Fe Rwy. Co., 83 Kan. io4,
Pac. oo5 (gxio); Margold v. Bacon, 237 Mo. 496, 5x6, 141 S.W. 6_o
(igii), where it was said "an appellate court is a court for the dorrection
of errors-its own as well as those of others." See also 2 Van Fleet, Former
Adjudication, 1o3.
'In Messenger v. Anderson, z25 U. S. 436, 444 (1g2).
U2 R. C. L 226. In some jurisdictions the rule has been changed, by
statute. Mann v. Dorden, 17r Ala. 142, 54 So. 5o4 (1g1) ; 4 C J. Iogg
1o9

uSuPra, note 2

"Stacy v. Vermont Central Railroad Co., supra, note 8; Cooper Union

NOTES

the appellate court has no power to review its own decisions; 27 that
the principle of stare decisis applies; "8 that the party in whose favor
the prior decision operated has a vested right in the same of which
he cannot be divested; "1 or that it would be unfair to the parties,
who in the second trial shaped their evidence in accordance with
the law as pronounced on the first appeal, to overturn those rules of
law and make them proceed on a different basis.20
It is difficult to see how the matter can be considered as res
adjudicata, no final judgment having been declared and the case
still being in process of trial.2 1 Also, if the decision of the court
was incorrect, no reason should exist why it could not, at any time
before the final determination of the cause, review the same and
correct it.22 As for the court being bound by tfie principle of stare
decisis (which cannot apply, there being no final adjudication which
can act as a precedent 281), it is well settled that decisions based on
bad law can, with propriety, be overruled in subsequent cases, 2 4 and
the same should hold true, with greater force, where the bad law
can be set aside before the case becomes a precedent. As to the arguments that there is a vested right, and that reversal would work
a hardship* on the parties, the fact that the court has made a mistake should not operate to give the party favored thereby a vested
right in such mistake, especially where the litigation is not ended,
so as to prevent the court from correcting itself; 25 and the hardship
caused thereby deserves less consideration than the injustice which
would be caused the party prejudiced by the mistake if judgment
v. Laudy, 161 N. Y. 429, 55 N. E. 914 (zgoo); Blorgo v. First National
Bank of Emmons, z32 Minn. 273, 156 N. W. 277 (x9z6).
'Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 44 U. S. 413 (1845); Leese v.
Clark, supra, note io.
'Supra, note x6.
'Taliaferro v. Barnett, 47 Ark. 359.(886).
- Allen v. Bryant, supra, note io.
'Keele v. Railway Co., 258 Mo. 62, 167 S. V. 433 (1914). Attention is
directed to the remarks of Mr. Justice McKenna, in Southern Rwy. C. v.
Clift, 26o U. S. 316, 319 (922), as to the distinction between the rule of
the law of the case and res adjudicata: "The former ruling may -have been
followed as the law of the case but there is a difference between such adher-

ence and res judicala; one directs discretion, the other supersedes it and
compels judgment."
' Ry. Co. v. Merrill, supra, note xx.
"Even those courts which adhere to the doctrine agree that, if erroneous,
the law as laid down is not to be considered a precedent in other cases. 4
C. J. io96.
" Wn., REs ADJUDXcATA AND STARz DEcisis, 5S.
"School Directors v. City of Asheville, 137 N. C. 5o3, So S. . 279
(19o5); 18 C0t. LAW REv. 79.
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were permitted to go against him because of persistent adherence
to it.26
In this connection, the recent case of Gohmtan v. City of St.
Bernard2 7 is interesting, in that one of the grounds upon which it
seeks to support the doctrine of the law of the case as being a rule
which is binding although the law as laid down is- in point of fact
erroneous is that of estoppel. In that case the plaintiff sued for
damages caused by the adoption of an unreasonable grade in front
of her property. From judgment against the defendant, an appeal
was taken. The appellate court reversed the judgment for alleged
error in the charge of the court, and remanded the case for a new
trial with instructions to charge on the question of damages in a
particular way. The trial court charged in the language of the appellate court as directed. The -plaintiff having obtained a larger
verdict on this trial, the city again appealed, and this time to a different intermediate appellate court, which, upon review, concluded
that the charge as given was clearly incorrect, and certified the case
to the supreme court of the state. That court held,28 that, although
the charge was admittedly erroneous, it had become the law of the
case, and that the party prejudiced thereby, the city in this case, by
its failure to prosecute error to the supreme court in the first instance and by its action in going to trial again on the basis of the
law as laid down, had elected to be bound by such law and could not
be heard now to set up its inaccuracy.
There is very strong a-ithority to the effect that while the law
of the case is binding on the court which announced it, if that court
is an intermediate appellate court, it is not binding, if erroneous, on
the court of final appeal." The Ohio case, therefore, is directly opposed to this authority. It is further submitted that its view that
the party prejudiced by the law as laid down has elected to adopt
that law and is estopped from later attempts to overthrow it is un-*
tenable. It is incorrect to say that such a party has elected anything; he has merely submitted to the decree of the court. If the
court later perceives it has made a mistake, there is no reason why it
should not be rectified for the benefit of the aggrieved party. The
objection to the idea of the court that if the party does not prosecute error to the supreme court he is later estopped is well ex"Supro, note 22.
1146 N. E. 29! (Ohio,

1924).

There were three dissents in the case. The court ordered a new trial
as the trial court had not given full effect to the decree of the appellate
court on the first appeal, and hence the rule of the law of the case could not
be invoked. 4 C. J. io98. Hence, it is submitted, the extended remarks of
the court in support of the doctrine are largely dicta.
" Fieet v. American Electric *Supply Co., 257 Ill. 248, i03 N. E. 552
(1913) ; 2 T.XAS L. REV. 36t.

NOTES
30
pressed in the dissenting opinion, in the thought that this holding
"would compel every litigant to prosecute error, directly or by
cross-petition, in order to obtain, not the judgment of this court
upon the whole case, but its views on every legal phase that may be
presented upon the several trials. This the litigant need do for his
self-protection. Such practice is not conducive to the speedy end of
litigation."
It has been forcefully urged that if the rule of the law of the
case is not made absolutely binding in its operation, an encouragement will be held forth to frequent appeals to influence the court to
take a different view, or to speculate in change in the personnel of
the court in the hope that the newly constituted tribunal ma be more
favorably disposed.'1 An illustration of this occurred in the case of
Johnson "v. Cadillac Motor Co.3' On the first appeal the law was
laid down that the defendant even though negligent was not liable
for injuries caused to the plaintiff by a defectively constructed automobile, as it was not the immediate vendor of the plaintiff and there
was no privity of contract. When the case came up again on a second appeal two of the three judges were new members, and had not

sat when the first decision' was rendered. On the authority of "MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,38 it was held that the defendant
was liable, on the doctrine of imminently dangerous articles, and
the prior holding was held not to be binding as the law of the case,
being considered clearly erroneous.
While this case does indicate the danger which results from too
readily overturning the law as laid down, especially where there is
strong doubt as to whether it is not correct,"8 it is submitted that
the dangers of repeated appeals on this ground have been greatly
exaggerated. In the first place the argument assumes that there will
be a change in the court's personnel on the second appeal, which is
not altogether a certainty; furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the second court will lightly disregard,what has been declared as the law of the case. The efficacy of the rule of the law
of the case should lie in the power it gives the appellate court on a
second appeal to refuse to reconsider questions previously decided,
where it is convinced those findings are good law. But it should go
no further than that, even though prolongation of the litigation will
result.

In the leading case of Hastings v. Foxworthy,'3 on the

fourth appeal, ten years after the case had commenced, a new trial
"At page 303.
'Supra, note 8.
"261 Fed. 878 ('9).
=217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. xoso (zq16).
"2o CoT L REv. 612.
"45 Neb. 676, 63 N. W. 955 (180S). See 34 L. R. A. 32z, note.
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was ordered over the objection of counsel that the law as laid down

on a prior appeal, although erroneous, had become the law of the
case and could not be departed from. Where the issue is between
winding up the case expeditiously and deciding it on solid grounds
of correct legal principles, the latter should prevail. Where error
has occurred, the true rule for the appellate court should be not
stare decisis, the law of the case, or the like, but "fiat justitia ruat
caelum." so
M.E.C.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AS A MEANS OF REVIEW OF STATZ

DEcxsoNs.-Federal review of.the administration of crimitial law
by the states, by means of application to the Federal courts for a writ
of habeas corpus, has been viewed with alarm as presenting a new
method of delay in criminal prosecution, a new burden upon the
Federal judiciary, and a new'point of conflict between the dual sovereignties.
A recent district court case . shows that the limits of this jurisdiction are as yet obscurely known, and calls for a reconsideration
of the two leading cases which opened this field, Frank v. MangUmn
and Moore v. Dempsey.' In the former case, a prisoner convicted
of murder in a state court, having exhausted all other remedies,"
asked for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his confinement was a deprivition of liberty without due process of law and
therefore in violation of the Constitution. His reasons were first,
that the court and jury were under the influence of mob violence,
and second, that he was not present at the rendering of the verdict.
The supreme court of the state had held that this latter objection
Ellison v. Georgia Railroad Co., 87 Ga. 69r, .3 S. E. Sf9 (igi), where
the court observed that "some courts live by correcting the errors of others
and adhering to their own."
' United States v. Ashe, 2 Fed. (2d) 7.5 (D. C., W. Dist. Ph., 1924).
'237 U. S. 309 (x9T5).
See Henry Schofield "Federal Courts and

Mob Domination of State Courts: Leo Frank's Case," io ILL. L. REv. 479;
and note,- 28 HARe. L Rnr. 793.
1261 U. S. 86 (923).
See also 9 VA.L. REv. 5s6; 33 YALE L. JouM. 82;
37 HARv. L. Rxv. 247.
4

Writ of error refused by Supreme Court of Georgia; Frank v. State,
i4!Ga. 243, 8o S. E. ioi6 (1913) ; refusal of extraordinary motion for new
trial affirmed; Frank v. State. x42 Ga, 617, 83 S. E. 233 (1914) ; refusal to
grant motion to set aside verdict affirmed; Frank v. State,- 142 Ga. 741, 83 S.
E. 645 (1914) ; application for writ of error denied by U. S. Supreme Court;
In the Matter of Leo Frank, 235 U. S. 694 (1914). As to the hecessity for
appeal before application for habeas corpus, cf. Egan v.. Knewel, 298 Fed.
784, 789 (I. C., x924) : "It is idle to say that petitioner should be required to
seek a review of the proceedings in the state court by writ of error upon a
record that obviously could not sustain a judgment of conviction." This
view, however, is not supported by authority.

NOTES

was waived by a failure to present it on appeal.5 The United States
Supreme Court, on appeal from a dismissal of the writ on demurrer,
held first, that there was not sufficient evidence of mob violence and
second, that the doctrine of waiver was not contrary to due process.
It is stated in the opinion that no writ of habeas corpus can issue.
if the jurisdiction of the trial court is perfect; 6 then the court goes
on to discuss due process; T from this it might be inferred that proceedings contrary to due process, for that reason alone exceed the
jurisdiction of the state trial court. Or the decision may be explained on the ground that in this case there are two questions
which must be considered separately-is the relator held by virtue
of proceedings which exceed the jurisdiction or power of the trial
court, so that a writ of habeas corpus may issue; and, is the relator
held and so deprived of liberty without due process of law, so that
there is a Federal question and the writ may issue from the district
court? Any holding beyond the jurisdiction of the court is a violation of due process,8 but not every violation of due process de-'
prives the court of jurisdiction.' The case of Moorc v. Denpsey"
presents a situation where the same facts which made out a case
of undue process ilso made out a case of lack of jurisdiction. There,
on appeal from a dismissal of the writ on demurrer, it was held
that there was a sufficient showing of mob domination over the state
trial which resulted in a murder conviction, to warrant an investigation by the district court." It may be conceded that such domination may reach a point where, just as the actions of individuals are
legally inoperative because of duress, so the court will no longer be
in legal effect a court, when further proceedings will be coram non
judice. 2 Accordingly, it seems that the Supreme Court has gone no
'Frank v. State, T42.Ga. 74t, 83 S. E. 645 (xgi4j.
'Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, at 326, 327.
'Id., M et seq.
'Hannis Taylor. Due Process of Law, ch. VII (i917).

'Cf. McMick.ng v. Schields. 238 U. S. 99 (9x5), where the court refused the writ because no jurisdictional objection was presented, without deciding whether or not there was any lack of due process. This case arose
under the due process clause of the Organie Act of the Philippine Islands,
but no reason is seen to distinguish it from a case arising in the states. Kepner v. U. S., 195 U. S. oo (i9o4). And cf. In re Green, 134 U. S. 377 (1890).
'Supra, note 3. and see 7 MNx. L. REv. 513, 514. In the main, this
case has been considered in its bearing on the constitutional qucstion of

whether trial by a mob-dominated tribunal is a deprivation of life or liberty
without due process of law, rather than in its relation to the law of habeas
corpus.

' The Federal court is authorized to investigate all facts, even extraneous

to the record, bearing upon the illegality of the prisoner's detention.
STA.. sections 754-76r.

REv.

The Supreme Court in Moore v. Dempsey did not hold that such a
pioint had been in fact reached; the demurrer admitted mob-domination. For
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further than to hold a proceeding which was beyond the jurisdiction
of the state court lacking in due process, and therefore sufficient to
justify the issue of a writ of habeas corpus from a Federal court.
The statute granting to the Federal courts the power to issue writs
of habeas corpus does not suggest that lack of due process is to be
ground for the.issue of the writ, except as it furnishes a ground for
Federal jurisdiction.' s Under this view all state criminal trials in
which any question of due process arose would be subject to review
in the district courts. Such jurisdiction would approximate habeas
corpus to a writ of error, and it is a stock phrase, repeated by the
Supreme Court in both Frank v. Mangum and Moore v. Dempsey
that habeas corpus "cannot be employed as a substitute for a writ
of error."'

-

The case of United States v. Ashe 25 illustrates the error to
which a misconception of these two cases may lead. The relator
shot and killed a thug in alleged self-defense, and also shot and
killed an officer in immediate pursuit. He was separately indicted
for the two homicides, but tried for both at the same time and before the same jury. Verdicts of guilty of murder in the first and
second degrees, respectively, were rendered. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania this double trial was held proper procedure under the law of Pennsylvania."! Then a writ of habeas cor-

pus was granted by the Federal -district court on the following inverted reasoning: this procedure was improper by the law of Pennsylvania; the law of Pennsylvania is the law of 'the land (as to
this case), so that relator was deprived of liberty without due
process of law; 2T the court was ousted of jurisdiction because-and
when, it denied to relator due process of law. This offers a variety of

error. First, even if there were hostile precedents 1s as- to such a
mob domination as ground for new trial, see State v. Wilcoxt, 131 N. C. 707,

42 S. P. 536 (x902).

""The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in

jail, unless where he . . . is in custody in violation of the Constitution or

of a law or treaty of the United States." REv. STAT., section 753. It will
be noted that this is the language of restriction rather than of grant.
2'See cases collected by Charles P. Williams, "Federal Habeas Corpus,"
9 ST. Louis L.Rv., 250, 260, n. 41.

"Supia, -note . For a report of the propaganda for pardon in this case,
and the opinion of the district judge of the evidence on which the conviction
was based, see 57 CaicAco LEGAL NEws 75.

"Commonwealth v. Valotta, 279 Pa. 84, 123 Att. 681 (1924).

lIt is already settled that a trial for two offenses at the same time and
before the same jury does not violate the due trocess clause if there is a
community of transaction between the crimes. Pointer v. U. S, 1S U. S.
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(893);

McElroy v. U. S., 164 U. S. 76 (896).

No consideration was

given to the relation of these two homicides. The only reason advanced to
support the contention that this was not a proper procedure was that it was

not permissible under the law of Pennsylvania.
'There is strong dicta in Withers v. Commonwealth, S Serg. & . 59

NOTES
double trial in Pennsylvania. the very decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court establishes that practice as the law of the land.'
Second, even admitting that the Supreme Court could err in Pennsylvania law, to say that the proceeding was therefore a violation of
due process is to erect a Federal right guaranteeing that all criminal
trials in the states shall be free from mistakes of law (as the Federal judge conceives it) on the part of the state judiciary. Up to
this time the United States Supreme Court has been satisfied with
the conduct of trials if the court has jurisdiction, and notice and opportunity for hearing are given to the parties.20 The doctrine of
this case is an innovation. It suggests a truly startling extension of
Federal supervision. 2' Third, even if this procedure was in violation of due process, it does not necessarily follow that the court was
ousted of jurisdiction.2 2 A court does not lose jurisdiction by committing error.28 Violation of due process is of interest not as justifying the issue of the writ, but as the foundation of Federal jurisdiction. To allow habeas corpus to be extended beyond its proper
sphere to all cases involving due process would be a duplication of
review, since writ. of error and certiorari are already provided. 24 .
As already suggested, it presents a new method of delay in criminal
prosecution, a new burden upon the Federal judiciary, .and a new
point of conflict between the dual sovereignties.
B. M.
(Pa.. i8ig), in support of the district court's contention, but the later case
of Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa. 85, iol At. 676 (i919) allowed without discussion the trial of two homicides at the same time and before the
same jury.
"'The law of the State or any organized body of men. is composed of
the rules which the courts, that is. the judicial organs of that body, lay down
for the determination of legal rights and duties." Gray, The Nature and
Sources of the Law, 84 (1921).
See Hannis Taylor, Due Process of La-w, 574-577 (1917).
' Mere error of law by a state court'has never been held a denial of due
process. Kennard v. La., 9z U. S.480 (1875) ; Arrowsmith v. Harmoning,
118 U. S.io4 (1885): Castillo v. McConnico. 168 U. S.674 (1897) ; McDonald
v. Oregon R. R. & Navigation Co., 233 U. S.665 (1914).
"See discussion ante.
1Ex parte Harding, i2o U. S.782 (1887) ; In re Green, 134 U. S.377
(i89o); Matter of Moran, 203 U. S. 105 (igo6); McMicking v. Schields,
supra, note 9.
11Cf. attitude of Filer.v. Steele, 22S Fed. 242 (D. C., iq95), on application for habeas corpus as a last resort:."He was tried in a court of competent jurisdiction, and exhausted his legal remedies, not only in the trial
court, but in the appellate court, where he was heard on the very question
which forms the basis of this application. The judgrient of the Supreme
Court being adverse, he made three separate applications to the judges of
the Supreme Court for a writ of error, which applications were denied. It
%nustbe presumed that, had his applications for a writ of error presented a
case of deprivation of liberty without due process of law, such writ 'would
have been awarded then."

